In a recent issue of PNAS, Taylor et al. (1) claimed that New Caledonian crows can reason about hidden causal agents (HCAs). Crows first experienced three trials in the HCA condition: they saw a human enter a hide within their aviary; a stick being poked from the hide toward a foraging site; and the human leaving. In the subsequent unknown causal agent (UCA) condition, the crows only saw the poking. The animals inspected the hide less often in the first condition, prompting the authors to suggest that the crows "attributed the movement of the stick. . .to the agent" and that the crows inferred that the stick was unlikely to move again once the human had left. The authors encouraged future comparative studies to adopt the same methodology to uncover the evolutionary forces that led to this cognitive ability, which we agree would be an interesting endeavor. However, we suggest additional controls are critical if the results are to be diagnostic of the ability to represent causes or agency.
Did the crows think of the movement as caused by or simply associated with a human? Because all crows were tested in the same order, they might have learned to associate poking with a human presence inside the hide over the first three trials. When the crows subsequently exhibited high levels of inspection after only seeing poking in the UCA condition, were they looking for the cause of the poking, or just for a human presence? Would pairing another cue with human entry and exit have led to similar rates of inspection if the cue were presented alone? To reject this account, future studies should counterbalance the order of condition presentation or explicitly compare inspection rates to poking with a cue that is not consistent with an agentive cause.
Similarly, do crows reason that only agents are capable of initiating movement? Would another cue to the beginning and end of the poking event have the same effect on inspection rates? In the studies on preverbal infants that Taylor et al. (1) cited, infants anticipate that a human hand should be revealed from the origin of object movement and are surprised if it is revealed on the opposite side, but they have no such anticipation about the likely location of an inanimate object (2). Future studies should include a condition in which an inanimate cue signals the start and the end of the poking event to investigate whether agents are represented as a special class of possible cause/predictor.
Finally, an obvious difference between conditions is that, in the HCA condition, the sight of the experimenter appearing after the stick poking to leave the aviary might have distracted the test subject from the poking event, thus reducing the tendency to inspect the poke hole. To reject this "distraction" hypothesis, future studies should include a distractor between the poking action and start of the test trial in the UCA condition, such as having an experimenter come and tug the hide.
